Elements for a Structural Constructivist Theory of Politics and of European Integration. CES Working Paper, no. 104, 2003 by Kauppi, Niilo.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Center for European Studies 
Working Paper Series #104 
Elements for a Structural Constructivist Theory of Politics  
and of European Integration
1
by 
Niilo Kauppi 
Senior Research Fellow, Academy of Finland 
Visiting Scholar, Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Pierre Bourdieu’s structural constructivist theory of politics offers powerful instruments for a critical analy-
sis of political power. In this paper, I explore structural constructivism as a theory of politics and of Euro-
pean integration. By structural constructivism I refer to a mostly French research tradition that develops 
some of Bourdieu’s theoretical tools. In European studies, social constructivism has provided an alternative 
to traditional approaches such as intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism. Structural constructivism 
remedies some of the weaknesses of most versions of social constructivism, such as their diffuse concep-
tion of power and ideational notion of culture. This paper develops a structural constructivist approach that 
examines the European Union as a multileveled and polycentric emerging political field. 
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Until now, the growing secondary literature on Pierre Bourdieu’s work has neglected his theory of politics. 
Moreover, Bourdieu never himself studied the European Union, which he considered politically and morally 
condemnable in its current, neoliberal form.
2 However, several scholars have adapted some of Bourdieu’s 
analytical tools to the study of political phenomena and, more recently, of the European Union.
3 In the first and 
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second sections of this paper, I provide a critical interpretation of Bourdieu’s structural constructivist political 
theory, discussing his analysis of domination and the political field and contrasting these with other theories, 
especially Max Weber’s. In the third part, I outline a structural constructivist
4 approach to European integration. 
  Bourdieu’s structural constructivist theory of politics offers a powerful vision of society and new instruments 
for the study of  domination and electoral politics. Drawing mostly on Max Weber and Karl Marx, but also on 
Émile Durkheim and Robert Michels, Bourdieu elaborated a complex but pessimistic and disenchanted view of 
politics. Indeed, towards the end of his life, he became a prominent political figure in the anti-globalization 
struggle. Bourdieu’s theory of politics can be divided into three components: a general analysis of the social 
aspects of the political (le politique) and domination, a more specific analysis of politics (la politique), and the 
political practice that he developed at the end of his career. The first component elaborates chiefly on Weber’s 
sociology of domination and its analysis of the political. In Bourdieu’s Marx inspired framework, the struggle for 
domination takes place between the dominant and the dominated. The second component restricts political action 
to a specific location, the political field. Here, in contrast to the first component, and following Weber’s 
phenomenological idea of life spheres, Bourdieu sees politics as forming an area of activity that can be separated 
from other areas of  activity such as the economy, religion, education, and culture. For Bourdieu, the division of 
society into social classes forms the explanatory basis for the analysis of political activity, and the world of 
representation is one site of the political struggle between the dominant and the dominated. 
 
I. Domination 
       
To conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all 
their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will ... this done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called 
a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS.
5
 
In Bourdieu’s mind, the right that its citizens have to formulate political opinions and emit political judgments is 
the fundamental characteristic of any democratic regime. In theory, democracy is composed of citizens who, with 
certain age limits, are all equal. However, as Bourdieu demonstrates in his numerous studies on political opinion
6, 
socially the ability to produce a political opinion and to emit a political judgement is unequally distributed. The 
technical competence that has to do with political judgement is actually a social competence. This ability varies 
with educational qualifications and age, among other factors. Those endowed with cultural and economic resources 
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will also be to make political judgements. As in other areas of activity, in politics a concentration of the objectified 
or embodied instruments of production of political opinions can be observed. In this sense, Western democracies 
are already selective democracies, as only part of the population has the symbolic means to produce a political 
opinion, to access the order of political discourse, and thus to fully partake in political culture.  
  Not every answer to a question considered political is necessarily the product of a political judgement. 
Bourdieu differentiates three modes of production of opinion.
7 The first depends on class ethos, which enables the 
opinion provider to formulate coherent, common-sense answers that follow the logic of everyday existence. 
Political principles, “slant,” or logos provide the grounding for the second mode of production of political opinion. 
Both modes are amenable to logical control and reflexive scrutiny. A third mode of production of political opinion 
consists of delegation of the formulation of political opinions to an organization providing a political line, such as a 
party, trade union, or other political organization. This delegation can be based on either class ethos or “slant.” 
  What differentiates the first mode of production from the second and the third is that in the case of class 
ethos the principles of production of political judgement are implicit. The relationship between class and opinion is 
direct and unconscious. In Bourdieu’s mind, this is very problematic, as  “dispositions without consciousness are 
self-opaque and always exposed to seduction by false recognitions.”
8 In contrast, the relationship between social 
class and political opinion is indirect in the second and third modes, mediated by the logos of either a specific 
political axiomatics or a political organization. Bourdieu provides a complementary division in the analysis of 
political opinion with production by proxy versus first-person production. He designates as production by proxy 
the delegation of the power to produce political opinions to a party or other political organization that represents 
the individual. By first-person production Bourdieu means that individuals use their own resources to formulate 
political opinions.  
  As the ability to formulate political opinions is unequally distributed, those with more educational resources 
are more likely to be able to formulate them than those who have none. In Bourdieu’s words, “The probability of 
producing a political response to a politically constituted question rises as one moves up the social hierarchy (and 
the hierarchy of incomes and qualifications).”
9 Bourdieu also analyzes the mechanisms that influence the ability to 
produce an answer to a “political question”.
10 Variations in this ability depend less on technical expertise or on 
knowledge of politics than on the social competence that translates into the feeling of having the right to have a 
political opinion.
11 In other words, the ability to imagine the political is as unequally distributed as political 
competence.  
  Bourdieu is interested in the role played by faith and trust in political judgement, especially in the case of 
production by proxy. An element of implicit faith is inscribed in the logic of political choice. Selecting 
representatives involves choosing not only among programs and ideas, but also among personalities. The first 
element of uncertainty concerns the object of judgement: is it a person or is it a set of ideas? Because a person is 
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endowed with a certain habitus, s/he embodies certain ideas that might not be expressed at the moment of choice. 
These unexpressed ideas and opinions exist in an implicit mode. On the one hand, the representative expresses the 
already formulated ideas of his/her electors, and, on the other hand, s/he follows his/her own “internal programme - 
or the specific interests associated with his position in the field of ideological production”.
12 In some cases, there is 
correspondence between speech and spokesperson. However, even in these cases usurpation is possible, as the 
representative might bring into existence opinions that were  not previously expressed and thus were not known by 
the mandators at the moment they made their choice. 
  In surveys, the least competent persons in matters of political opinion must choose between answers that take 
on their meaning in relation to a political issue, that is, to a political position in the field of ideological production. 
Because these individuals can produce a “yes” or “no” answer to a question but cannot necessarily grasp the 
political meaning of the question asked, those asking the questions can impose on them a political position. In this 
way, “the respondents are dispossessed of the meaning of their response”,
13 a response which is totally alien to 
their own opinion but which is nevertheless presented as being their opinion. These least competent persons either 
then respond to an alien question or answer the question as they understand it, retranslating it into their own 
language. Thus, “‘rationalization of budgetary options’ becomes ‘not wasting money’.”
14 Through this mechanism, 
the respondent resorts to his or her class ethos and its unconscious presuppositions. Bourdieu underlines the 
conservative nature of these predispositions, tied to the world by practical logic. The task of formulating 
revolutionary political stances is left to political organizations. 
  The field of ideological production is the realm of professional politicians, an area from which the profanes 
are excluded. It is in this realm that political problems, programs, and ready-made solutions are produced. This 
production of political opinion and judgement attempts to achieve collective mobilization around common 
problems, to universalize certain particular interests by making their particular condition appear universal. 
However, part of the problem of translation of the implicit into the explicit is that there is a radical discontinuity 
between condition and discourse, between ethos and logos. That is, the unconscious character of practical logic, its 
inscription in bodily hexis, that is, in everyday schemes of perception and appreciation, and in the implicit political 
underpinnings of class habitus, do not necessarily translate into definite political stances or opinions understood as 
positions in the field of ideological production. It is precisely because of the indeterminancy of the relationship 
between ethos and logos that professional political agents of all kinds - politicians, journalists, publicists, etc. - play 
such a key role in the production of political opinion, shaping the world of the politically imaginable and the 
structures and main dividing lines of the field of ideological production. 
  Bourdieu’s theory of electoral and democratic politics concentrates on analysis of political representation and 
symbolic political struggles. Following Thomas Aquinas, Bourdieu discusses the delegation of political power by 
the people to a representative as a form of alienation.
15 The people alienate their original sovereignty to a 
plenipotentiary representative, a party and/or an individual. An isolated individual cannot make himself heard in 
politics unless s/he transforms this isolated voice into group voice. But this means s/he must dispossess him- or 
herself of a voice in order to escape political dispossession. In a landmark study entitled “Delegation and Political 
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Fetishism,” Bourdieu analysed the power of delegation as a purely political power that enables a group to form by 
delegating power to a representative.
16 In very Durkheimian fashion, the process of delegation becomes a case of 
social magic in which a person such as a minister, a priest, or a deputy is identified with a group of people: the 
workers, the nation, believers, etc. The group no longer exists as a collection of individuals but rather, through this 
representative, as a social agent. In this case, delegation signifies alienation implicitly consented to by those 
represented and dissimulated usurpation by the representative. As Robert Michels put it, “le parti, c’est moi”.
17 
Bourdieu reveals the double process of recognition and misrecognition inscribed in political delegation: “A 
symbolic power is a power which presupposes recognition, that is, misrecognition of the violence that is exercised 
through it”.
18
  The representative exists in a metonymical relationship with the group. S/he is a member of the group, that is, 
a part of it, but at the same time s/he stands for the group as a whole, is a sign of the group. The representative 
represents the group and speaks in its name,
19 the relationship between representative and represented being similar 
to that between signifier and signified. But at the same time, those represented have a fides implicita in the 
representative. S/he is given a blank check. Bourdieu seems to say that this separation of rulers and ruled means 
that democracy is impossible. The paradox of the monopolization of collective truth is for Bourdieu the principle of 
all symbolic imposition: a person speaks in the name of the group and thus manipulates the group in its own 
name.
20 The organization quickly supplants the group. “People are there and speak. Then comes the party official, 
and people come less often. And then there is an organization, which starts to develop a specific competence, a 
language all of its own.”
21
  In his discussion of how groups function, Bourdieu sketches two approaches to the problem of political 
opinion and competence. The first type centers on markets, votes, and polls. In such approaches, individuals are 
demobilized and groups are reduced to aggregates.
22 In the case of individual speech or of voice, to use Albert 
Hirschman’s term,
23 the mode of aggregation is statistical or mechanical. It is independent of the individuals and 
the group does not exist politically, that is, as a political entity. Bourdieu contrasts this conception, which he calls 
liberal,
24 with Émile Durkheim’s corporatist conception of political opinion. According to Durkheim
25 - and before 
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him Jean-Jacques Rousseau - individual votes would ideally be animated by a collective spirit. They would express 
the community’s opinion, will, and constitute a relatively permanent and coherent group. The elementary electoral 
college should be not a collection of isolated individuals but rather a permanent and integrated group, a body with a 
spirit animated by tacit accord founded on complicity. For Bourdieu, this corporatist philosophy is the implicit 
philosophy of electoral democracy.
26
  Bourdieu analyzes political action as consisting mostly or even exclusively of symbolic action: speeches, 
writings, and other symbolic interventions. A key concept in Bourdieu’s sociology of domination is that of 
symbolic violence, the imposition of a cultural code. Here he is not referring to symbolic systems à la Durkheim. 
Symbolic power does not stem from the illocutionary force of speech, as it does for Austin or Searle. Rather, words 
have an effect when they confirm or transform the vision people have of the world. Behind the words is belief in 
the person who utters them and in the legitimacy of the words being uttered. Who is speaking? is the first question 
that should be asked when the legitimacy of a political message is being evaluated. Symbols make visible and 
make invisible. They reveal certain aspects of reality while hiding others. For instance, the working class does not 
exist as a physical entity, it is a symbolic construction that has become real because it has become an accepted part 
of political reality. The same goes for the state and most concepts that form part of political reality. These entities 
exist to the extent that representatives feel authorized to speak in their name, thus giving them real political force. 
  Symbolic violence is the basic mechanism by which domination is unconsciously reproduced by the 
dominated. In Bourdieu’s theory, the dominated have to participate in the domination that is exerted on them, 
otherwise it would not be legitimate. Reproduction of domination takes place with the consent of those dominated. 
Symbolic violence is transmitted in language and in social practices, and can be found in all human interaction. It 
is everywhere. Theoretically, at least, it can be contrasted with actions performed voluntarily. In practice, however, 
it is difficult to separate the two. The concept of symbolic violence can also be contrasted with that of physical 
violence, which is the monopoly of the state. In contrast to Michel Foucault’s work,
27 Bourdieu barely talks about 
physical violence and mastery over bodies,
28 though the public control of this kind of violence is a key feature of 
state formation. Instead, Bourdieu emphasizes the symbolic aspects of domination and the symbolic violence 
exercised by the schooling system, art, law, and more generally culture. 
  In Bourdieu’s vision, political action means acting on the social world, often by attempting to break with the 
world as a natural entity. Radical political action engages a radical epistemology
29 that questions the world as it is 
usually interpreted. For Bourdieu, the object of politics par excellence is knowledge of the social world and the 
struggle for the legitimate definition of reality. In the political arena, the value of an idea depends less on its truth 
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value than on its power to mobilize. Bourdieu states, following 19th French social philosopher Alfred Fouillée but 
without ever citing him, that in politics ideas are power-ideas (idées-forces).
30 Power-ideas like “liberty” or 
“equality” cannot be proven true or false. The only way for opponents to refute them is to oppose to them some 
alternative power-ideas. The political weight of power-ideas will depend on their capacity to mobilize, or to 
universalize which is the precondition for mobilization. In politics, saying is doing only to the extent that a political 
agent is politically responsible and capable of guaranteeing that the group will carry out the actions that the agent 
requires. Only then will political agents consider a political statement to be equivalent to an act. But the 
truthfulness of power-ideas is not verifiable or falsifiable when the ideas are expressed. Only if a statement such as 
“I will win the elections to the presidency” is realized in the future, will it be considered historically true. 
  Bourdieu’s analysis of political opinion, delegation, and the symbolic aspects of politics reduce politics to a 
struggle for domination. However, this conflict model is constructed on a harmony model based on the social 
characteristics of the agents involved in the struggle and their structural positions in various fields. The social field 
functions as the base structure of politics, the political game being the superstructure. In this vision, politics is 
about fetishism and the world of appearances.
31 The real game is backstage in the social field, connected to the 
political field by any number of homologies or structural equivalences. In the social field as in any field of social 
activity, social class is the ultimate determinant of success or failure for any individual. Instead of the Marxist 
dichotomy of the economic versus the cultural, one finds in Bourdieu’s theory of politics the dichotomy of the 
social versus the symbolic or the political.    
  Although some might say that modern Western states keep a monopoly over physical violence through the 
army and the police, it is exaggerated to say that the state holds the monopoly over symbolic violence. This is 
because while physical violence can be monopolized and its existence empirically verified, the same cannot be said 
of symbolic violence.
32 The power over bodies is of a different nature than the power over minds, which cannot be 
dominated by just one institution. Families, religions, companies, the media, and various kinds of associations and 
organizations compete with the state and other public institutions for control of this kind.  
 
II. The Political Field 
 
There are general laws of fields: fields as different as the field of politics, the field of philosophy or the field 
of religion have invariant laws of functioning. (That is why the project of a general theory is not 
unreasonable and why, even now, we can use what we learn about the functioning of each particular field to 
question and interpret other fields.)
33
 
It is perhaps in Bourdieu’s concept of the political field that his debt to Max Weber is the clearest, as he 
acknowledges himself: “[Max Weber was] the scholar who came the closest to the notion of ‘field’ yet, at the same 
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time, never reached it” (my translation).
34 Following Max Weber in his Zwischenbetrachtung,
35 Bourdieu analyses 
politics like any other area of social activity such as the economy, religion, or education.
36 In his theory the 
political field has the same structural characteristics as any other field. Political capital is symbolic capital in the 
field of politics, a type of capital that the agents involved in this field compete for. The political field has its own, 
autonomous logic, a formal binary logic that is substantiated by the historical development of political ideas, 
ideologies, and practices. Agents at the autonomous pole of the political field possess the most legitimate type of 
political capital, whereas agents at the heteronomous pole of the political field agents accumulate alternative types 
of political capital. The dominant have a lot of capital, the dominated relatively little. Through a process of 
sociomimesis, agents’ political stances and political strategies follow their positions in the political field. 
According to Bourdieu, “It is the structure of the political field, that is, the objective relation to the occupants of 
other positions, and the relation to the competing stances they offer which, just as much as any direct relation to 
those they represent, determines the stances they take, i.e. the supply of political products.”
37  
 In  contrast  to  Weber’s social spheres,
38 Bourdieu’s concept of the field is structural and relational. In his 
political theory, he conceptualizes politics topologically. The political field constitutes a space that is structured 
such that the value of each element of it is formed through the network of relationships this element entertains with 
the other elements in the field. In theory, then, the relative value of an element is determined by this set of 
relationships and not by any external factors, such international politics or the state of the economy in the case of 
the political field. Following Saussurean precepts, value is relational and not substantial. For this reason, 
distinction does not imply a search for distinction, as in Torstein Veblen’s theory of the leisure class. An existing 
element is always distinctive, that is distinguishable in theory and practice from other elements in a structure. If it 
was not, it would not exist. For this reason, intentionality is not an issue in Bourdieu’s field theory, or in his theory 
of the political field. 
  Like any field, the political field is subject to some general principles. The most important of these modus 
operandi is the field’s organization around two opposite poles: the protagonists of change and the apostles of law 
and order, the progressives and the conservatives, the heterodox and the orthodox. This binary logic not only 
structures political parties and ideologies; it permeates the political field as a whole, from political parties and other 
political organizations between the progressive and conservative wings, all the way down to the habitus of an 
individual who might have evolved from a radical youth into a conservative party official. The tension between 
order and change is present in the activities of revolutionary movements at all times: for instance, in the hesitations 
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of their leaders about using violence against their own supporters in order to effectively combat state authorities. 
As the political field becomes more autonomous, these struggles are sedimented and institutionalized, eventually 
forming part of the objectified and materialized social unconscious. Each political organization and the field as a 
whole develop their own esoteric cultures that are alien to outsiders. 
  The resources that structure the political field are political capital, as the specific resource that agents attempt 
to accumulate in the political field, economic capital, and cultural capital.
39 “Political capital is a form of symbolic 
capital, credit founded on credence or belief and recognition or, more precisely, on the innumerable operations of 
credit by which agents confer on a person (or on an object) the very powers that they recognize in him (or it).”
40 
Individuals are distributed throughout the field firstly according to the overall volume of capital they possess and, 
secondly, following the composition of their capital.
41 Those who succeed in accumulating the most political 
capital will be the dominant, while those who have the least capital will be the dominated.
42 The position of an 
individual in this structure determines his or her assets and discourses. An individual cannot occupy two positions 
at the same time. The structure is also a set of power relationships between individuals and groups in the political 
field. Moving beyond Saussure and Lévi-Strauss, who developed the dominant social scientific interpretation of 
Saussure’s theory, Bourdieu innovates by adding power to structures. Relationships are not only linguistic or 
symbolic but also social, involving power relations.  
  Like rational choice theorists, Bourdieu emphasizes that agents maximize utility. He assumes goal-oriented 
behavior that is directed toward the accumulation of status and power in the field. But Bourdieu’s approach is more 
flexible. Utility is field-specific, that is historically and socially constituted, and socially defined. Agents can be 
individuals, groups, institutions, firms, and so on. Not all agents succeed in accumulating status. Some resign 
themselves to subordinate status. Further, an agent’s self-interest also serves the general interest because it 
reinforces the legitimacy of the field’s values. In distinction to economic rationality, individuals often commit 
themselves to values, such as academic excellence, that can lead to reduced living standards for instance. Yet 
another difference between rational choice and Bourdieu’s field-theory is that in the latter individuals are not 
necessarily consciously choosing between different alternatives. Rather, guided by their habitus in their actions, 
they just know what the right thing to do (or then not).  
  In a way, Bourdieu’s logical framework for explaining the rationale of actions in a field shares some of the 
features with Simon’s concept of bounded rationality.
43 Individuals do not have complete information and they also 
have perceptional limitations. In the framework provided by Bourdieu’s theory these perceptional limitations can 
be attributed to three factors: the characteristics of fields, those of positions, and socio-cultural factors. In a field, 
certain aspects of reality are considered less important and are for that reason neglected. In some cases, their 
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neglect might be a condition of possibility of the field as a whole, its “illusio”. For instance, the rejection of 
worldly values can be considered as being a condition for the existence of the religious field. Limitations might 
also be due to an agent’s position in a field. The agents and groups occupying the dominant positions in a field 
might not see the effects of their actions on the dominated agents, for instance. Limitations might finally be linked 
to what Simon calls subjective aspects. In a structural constructivist framework, these could be called factors 
having to do with upbringing, class, or more broadly habitus.  
  In his text “Champ politique, champ des sciences sociales, champ journalistique,” Bourdieu discussed the 
political field as a microcosm of the social macrocosm. Like other areas of social activity it has its dominant and 
dominated, its “rich” and “poor”, its right and left. As in other areas of social activity, the more autonomous a field 
is, the more closed off it is from the outside world. In a relatively autonomous political field, the position of an 
individual will determine his or her political stances. Political agents attempt to monopolize the legitimate means 
of manipulating the social world.
44 They compete with journalists and social scientists in the struggle for the 
“monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence”,
45 a phrase borrowed from Weber’s discussion of the priesthood 
having the monopoly over the legitimate manipulation of the means of salvation and the state’s monopoly over 
legitimate violence.
46  
  The political field is “understood both as a field of forces and as a field of struggles aimed at transforming 
the relation of forces which confers on this field its structure at a given moment”.
47 It is composed of producers 
who have monopolized the production of political goods offered on the political marketplace. Ordinary citizens are 
reduced to the role of consumers exterior to this political field. The political stances of the moment, as seen, for 
instance, in electoral outcomes, are the result of an encounter between supply and demand. Both legitimate supply 
and legitimate demand are historically formed through social struggles between different groups to define them. 
Political supply consists of political goods offered by political enterprises, parties, trade unions, political clubs, and 
so on. These goods can be either symbolic, consisting of ideas and programs, or material, such as posts in the party 
hierarchy. The same applies to demand, which has been collectively and historically conditioned to take certain 
forms. Citizens have to choose among different types of political goods, problems, programs, analysis, concepts, 
events, and so on. Formally, consumers have equal access to political goods. In practice, however, social factors 
such as education and wealth limit access. Those who do have access to these resources become knowledgeable 
consumers, while those who lack these resources have no alternatives, and abstain in elections or rely totally on 
their political representatives.  
  The influence of Weber’s discussion of the priesthood is also evident in Bourdieu’s analysis of the 
relationship between political professionals and amateurs. As the political field gains in autonomy, the profanes 
become increasingly dispossessed of the properly political means of production. In France, professional politicians 
that have gone through elite French schools like the Instituts d’études politiques or the Ecole nationale 
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d’administration gradually replace amateur political activists.
48 This way the criteria that regulate entry into the 
political field also change. Bourdieu does not theorize the levels of autonomy, but as the field becomes more 
autonomous its internal mechanisms play a more central role in political activity.
49 To understand the specific 
meaning of a political stance, one must situate it in a relational network composed on the one hand of the other 
stances formulated at the time in the political field and, on the other hand, of the structure of the demand.   
  As political capital becomes objectified into posts in the party apparatus, relative independence from 
electoral sanction develops. For individuals in normal times, the temptation to integrate into the political apparatus 
grows as the material and symbolic spoils accumulated by the party are redistributed to the followers.
50 
Conversely, in exceptional or revolutionary times staying in the political apparatus can be risky. 
  Political agents are always, though to varying degrees, involved in a double game, the first internal to the 
political field and the second external to it, in the larger social field. In the political field itself professionals seek 
recognition from peers, whereas in the social field they seek support from the voters in elections. A political 
agent’s power in the political field depends on his or her capacity to speak in the name of those exterior to it, the 
profanes. A political agent’s dependence on the political apparatus varies according to his or her capital structure 
and volume. The less of other social resources such as education and personal wealth political agents have, the 
more dependent they are on the resources provided by delegation. The more they invest in the political apparatus, 
the more they become dependent on it.
51 Bourdieu has analyzed the social effects of this dispossession in the case 
of the French Communist party.
52 In contrast to intellectual groups or an aristocratic club, this type of political 
organization is built on both objective characteristics such as the posts it offers for its followers, and on subjective 
dispositions such as fidelity to the party and the convergence of its followers’ vision of the world and that of its 
leaders and militants. As political parties get more professional and more bureaucratic, professionals enter into 
competition among themselves for control over the political apparatus. “The struggle for the monopoly of the 
development and circulation of the principles of di-vision of the social world is more and more strictly reserved for 
professionals and for the large units of production and circulation, thus excluding de facto the small independent 
producers (starting with the ‘free intellectuals’).”
53 Thus, according to the logic of monopolization of the supply of 
political goods, the relatively limited access to these political goods of those most deprived of economic and 
cultural resources is reinforced. The more socially incompetent agents are in politics, the more they will depend on 
the supply of political goods and the more readily they will delegate their power to political entrepreneurs and 
organizations. This mobilization requires, from professional politicians, a double game, one in relation to the 
citizens and the other aimed at their competitors. Bourdieu assimilates political parties to military organizations 
that mobilize their resources to defeat their competitors on the battlefield of political life: 
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In parliamentary democracies, the struggle to win the support of the citizens (their votes, their party 
subscriptions, etc.) is also a struggle to maintain or subvert the distribution of power over public powers (or, 
in other words, a struggle for the monopoly of the legitimate use of objectified political resources - law, the 
army, police, public finances, etc.). The most important agents of this struggle are the political parties, 
combative organizations specially adapted so as to engage in this sublimated form of civil war by mobilizing 
in an enduring way, through prescriptive predictions, the greatest possible number of agents endowed with 
the same vision of the social world and its future. So as to ensure that this enduring mobilization comes 
about, political parties must on the one hand develop and impose a representation of the social world capable 
of obtaining the support of the greatest possible number of citizens, and on the other hand win positions 
(whether of power or not) capable of ensuring that they can wield power over those who grant that power to 
them.
54
 
  The main object of struggle among professionals in the political field is recognition from peers, or political 
capital as a specific type of symbolic capital. Bourdieu differentiates between two types of political capital, that 
acquired by the individual and that acquired by delegation. Individual political capital is the result either of slow 
accumulation, as in the case of French notables, or of action in a situation of institutional void and crisis,
55 in which 
case the concept is close to Weber’s charismatic legitimacy. Personal political capital disappears with the physical 
disappearance of the person holding this power. S/he is recognized and known for characteristics that are 
considered his or her own. Political capital is acquired by delegation through investiture by an institution, for 
instance, a political party or other political enterprise. A person such as a priest, a professor, or any official, 
receives from the institution a limited and provisional transfer of collective capital composed of recognition and 
fidelity.
56 Through this process the capital is partly transformed from collective to personal. Political capital 
becomes institutionalized in the form of posts and positions. Those in the service of political enterprises are their 
delegates.  
  Political capital by delegation thus refers to a situation where the power of a politician depends on the power 
of his or her party and of his or her position in the party. The leader of the party becomes, through investiture, a 
banker
57 and the party a bank specialized in political capital. The banker controls access to this collective capital, 
which is bureaucratized and certified by the party’s bureaucracy. Citing Antonio Gramsci, Bourdieu writes that 
political agents such as trade union representatives are “bankers of men in a monopoly situation.”
58
  Bourdieu presents the struggles of the representatives as offering nothing but mimesis of the stances of the 
social groups or social classes they represent.
59 Representatives are thus simultaneously conditioned by their 
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positions in the political field and their positions in the social field, at times miming one, at times the other, or even 
both at the same time. The homologies between their positions in the political field and the social field, and their 
locations in the political field and the field of production of political stances explains why they satisfy the needs of 
their electors without even consciously attempting to do so. As the congruence between representative and 
represented is of a semiotic nature, resembling the relationship between signifier and signified, congruence 
between what the representative says and what the electors think is necessary for representation to exist. This 
congruence also explains why, while competing with other politicians or political enterprises in the political field, 
representatives also satisfy the interests of those they represent. They serve themselves while serving others.  
  Bourdieu’s theory is Durkheimian and functionalist in its holistic analysis of the political field, and Weberian 
in its attempt to think of social and political processes using economic terms as models. Following Durkheim, 
Bourdieu sees the political in functionalist terms as forming a whole that is more than the sum of its parts. The 
logic of the whole conditions the role of the parts, and the whole takes on a life of its own that is independent of the 
parts. The logic of the political field determines the stances taken.
60 Bourdieu also sees political activity in terms of 
rituals, institutions, and symbolic action. A central ritual in his theory is that of investiture, whereby an individual 
is chosen to represent and constitute a group. Like Weber, for whom the modern state is an “enterprise” or a 
“business” (Betrieb),
61 for Bourdieu the offer and demand of political goods and the monopolization of capital are 
the main processes of political activity. As a result, sociology and political science paradoxically become subfields 
of economics (types of minor economics) miming economic terms and thought schemes. Political action becomes 
an inferior, because less rational, form of economic action. In Bourdieu’s theory of the political field, politics is 
seen as the realm of groups fighting for domination. Phenomena usually seen as political, such as the public 
sphere
62 and the rule of law, have no place in Bourdieu’s theory. Incorporating them would require drawing 
qualitative differences and distinguishing politics from other human activities in non-formal terms.     
  Since the 1960s Bourdieu has been studying the state, and specifically the French state. In Bourdieu’s theory 
of politics, the genesis of the state is “the culmination of a process of concentration of different kinds of capital, 
capital derived from physical force or instruments of coercion (the army, the police), economic capital, cultural, or 
better still informational capital, symbolic capital; a concentration which, as such, translates into possession of a 
sort of metacapital giving the bearer power over all the other kinds of capital and those who possess them” (my 
translation).
63 Through a process of privatization of public power prior to the existence of the state, certain social 
groups succeed in monopolizing various kinds of public authority. The new authority that emerges becomes 
responsible for calling the shots and deciding about the relative value of social resources and the exchange rates of 
these different types of resources. The state participates in a decisive manner in the production and reproduction of 
the instruments of construction of reality. In Bourdieu’s formulation, the state seems to be a kind of grand 
organizer that “constantly exercises a formative action of durable dispositions,” of dauerhabitus to use Weber’s 
term.
64 It imposes fundamental principles of classification on everybody - sex, age, competence, and so on.
65 Its 
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influence is everywhere. In the family, it controls the rites of institution; in the schooling system, it creates 
divisions between the chosen and the rejected, durable, often definitive symbolic divisions that are universally 
recognized and that often have determining effects on the future of individuals. The individual’s “voluntary 
servitude” to the state order is the result of the harmony between cognitive structures, either collective or 
individual, and the objective structures of the world to which they apply. It seems to be total. 
  Public authority is thus always private authority disguised as public authority which has succeeded, through 
symbolic violence, in transforming itself and presenting itself as representing the collectivity. Competition and 
symbolic violence among various groups - homo homini lupus - are endless, instituted by society in Rousseaun 
manner but lacking the positive basis Rousseau’s theory of primitive man has. There is no end to the struggle, no 
light at the end of the tunnel. In fact, it seems that in Bourdieu’s theory politics is by definition stateless, 
understood as genuine shared public authority. 
  Bourdieu’s account of political capital emphasizes its objectified nature. This is only one side of the story, 
however. Political capital as a symbolic resource has also to be used in order for it to be valuable. Capital gains are 
relatively modest and value is not just retrieved from a treasury. In this sense political action, which is curiously 
under- theorized in Bourdieu’s political theory, is the necessary condition for the existence of this type of resource. 
As political capital is less objectified than certain types of economic capital such as money on a bank account, its’ 
analysis has to concentrate on the political practices through which is it accumulated, and on the symbolic aspects 
of the political order. This poses problems for the objectification of political capital. As symbolic interaction 
contains to varying degrees emergent properties and elements of chance, the exact amount of political resources an 
agent has in his/her possession is difficult to determine. Further, as political action often involves bluff and, to 
varying degrees, the imposition of values (“symbolic violence”), value is to a large extent created through social 
interaction. Political reality is not just reproduced by agents, it is also created by them. In certain conditions the 
bluff is successful and reality is transformed to correspond to the goal of an action that initially was considered 
impossible or unlikely to be realized. In Bourdieu’s version of structural constructivism, social transformation 
takes place through reproduction of the social order in time. However, in certain conditions, individuals as political 
entrepreneurs can change this reality. A recent solution to the problem of accounting for creative action is the 
concept of social skill.
66 But it is difficult to see how the concept of social skill differs from Bourdieu’s concept of 
habitus (which includes skills) as they are both still embedded in a Aristotelian logic of potentiality/activity that 
does not take sufficiently into account the interactional qualities of symbolic resources. 
  Bourdieu’s analysis of political capital as a type of symbolic capital suffers from other weaknesses that a 
developed structural constructivist approach must address. In his general theory of fields, Bourdieu did not draw 
qualitative differences between different types of fields, between types of capital, or between politics and other 
human activities. For instance what I would call “generic fields,” such as the social field, have to be separated in 
terms of their properties from “specialized fields,” such as the European political field. Social fields will exist as 
long as human societies do. Consequently, generic social resources such as social capital, valid (in varying degrees 
of course) in all areas of human activity and in all human societies, do not have the same properties as more 
specialized resources such as European political capital that exist only at certain times and in certain places. 
Generic resources also can be more easily converted than more specialized resources into other resources. 
Moreover, fields have to be differentiated from one another in non-formal terms. For instance, the political field 
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contains specific inventions, such as elections as a means of allocating political power, that differentiate it from 
other fields like the literary field. 
  Bourdieu’s formal field-theoretical model enables comparison amongst different fields or a field’s historical 
stages. However, it is an ideal-typical construction in Weber’s meaning of the word. In reality, fields are always in 
formation in the sense that they are dynamic, incomplete entities subject to varying degrees of external influence. 
In reality, value is never totally Saussurean, that is, endogenously formed.   
  In Bourdieu’s theory, the public domain appears as an area where various private interests, masquerading as 
group interests, try to grab the public interest for themselves, or transform their particular interests into the public 
interest. Perhaps because politics is identified with power struggle other, crucial aspects of modern politics are not 
taken into account. Bourdieu’s version of a structural constructivist theory of politics does not elaborate on the 
specificity of democratic politics as a specific area of social activity. For instance, Bourdieu does not reflect on the 
specific historical meaning of elections. This is curious because, after all, the student does not choose his professor, 
children do not choose their parents, and workers to not choose their bosses. By law, public officials are supposed 
to further the public interest, although they sometimes use their legitimacy to further their particular ends. Political 
power is public power, and the state is the guarantor of public order.  
  In contrast to Weber, whose approach was historical, Bourdieu also does not distinguish among different 
kinds of political fields. For Bourdieu, the mechanism of power delegation operated the same way in the 
totalitarian Soviet Union as in democratic France
67 and in the religious and political domains. In the manner of 
Rousseau, he overemphasizes the profanes’ blind belief in and total submission to the delegate. But people are not 
as easily duped as Bourdieu would have us believe, and the media regularly denounces politicians for their 
wheeling and dealing. Bourdieu’s analysis of the state, to which he devotes a considerable amount of energy, is 
handicapped by insufficient analysis of the concept of the public. 
  In Bourdieu’s theory of the political field, politics is a game. In many ways, Bourdieu’s pessimistic analysis 
of politics is reminiscent of Plato’s critique of the Sophists. Politics is the realm of the arbitrary and the symbolic: 
it is deceit and cannot be the realm of the true and the beautiful. Perhaps for this reason he saw himself until the 
end as a critical intellectual, as a man of science among the people, at a distance from the political establishment. 
Bourdieu’s underlying ideal model of the political seems to be based on direct democracy in a polis composed of 
critical individuals, without parties or political organizations. Delegation of power and political representation 
logically lead to usurpation and manipulation, not to real democracy. 
  Bourdieu’s model for analyzing delegation, the monopoly of production of political goods, and  political 
power as symbolic power comes from Weber. So does his conception of politics as a separate life sphere
68 or field, 
which he developed using linguistic models adopted from Saussure and Lévi-Strauss. Political value is Weberian in 
the sense that it is fiduciary value, that is dependent on the legitimacy attributed to a person, organization, or idea, 
and Saussurean in the sense that it is relational value. But Karl Marx’s (and Louis Althusser’s) influence is also 
apparent. Apart from Bourdieu’s analysis of political fetishism, which duplicates in another semantic register 
Marx’s analysis of fetishism and merchandise circulation,
69 and his presentation of social value in terms of modes 
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of production and capital, the division of society into social classes is the ultimate explanatory device by which 
Bourdieu analyzes the political. Class struggle in the social field takes a sublimated form in the political field.
70 
Social classes structure the social field, a kind of superfield that is present in various forms in other spheres of 
social activity, including in politics. The social field and the political field are united by a pre-established 
qualitative harmony consisting of structural homologies. This harmony enables agents operating in different fields 
to find common interests tied to their relative positions in these fields. Thus for instance, those dominated in the 
field of power, the intellectuals, can, in certain historical circumstances, find common interests with those 
dominated in the social field, the working classes. 
  
III. Structural constructivism as an approach in European integration studies 
 
The political reality of the European Union is Janus-faced. On the one hand, it is an emergent system of 
governance that is networked, not hierarchical, and open, not closed.
71 On the other hand, the EU is far from being 
a power-free institutional and discursive space. Integration has produced new power centers, hierarchies, and 
political resources. Structural constructivist political theory systematizes some of Weber’s ideas by underlining the 
construction of reality by agents who, constrained and empowered by structures that are material and symbolic, 
struggle to accumulate political resources and increase their own power. Structural constructivist scholars are 
interested in revealing the hidden power mechanisms behind European integration. The key question of a structural 
constructivist approach to European integration is through what mechanisms political agents reproduce and 
transform the European political order. Research inspired by Bourdieu’s theory concentrates on specific objects, 
for instance new social groups such as Members of the European Parliament or European civil servants, connecting 
political strategies to structural location and social resources such as gender, class, and education, and linking these 
to broader social processes such as the professionalization of Europe and the constitution of a European political 
field.
72 These scholars develop some of Bourdieu’s theoretical concepts, such as the field as a structured entity of 
analysis, structural homology as a tool that enables to connect fields to one another, and social resources as 
instruments of political struggles. They construct their objects of research through a critique of preconceptions, 
combining statistical data with in-depth interviews, and linking habitus to the structures of fields. 
  Until the 1990s two models dominated scholarly discussion on European integration. The state-centric model 
emphasizes the role of nation-states in their attempts to strengthen and augment their power. According to some 
proponents of this intergovernmentalist and neorealist model,
73 the process of European integration has, in many 
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ways, strengthened rather than weakened European nation-states, which are still the key players in European 
politics. A second model, propagated by neofunctionalists, is called the multigovernance model. According to this 
model, nation-states are losing ground in the face of growing transnationalization and regionalization of decision 
making. The European Union has already become the main decision maker in Europe.
74
  New institutionalisms of rationalist, historical, and sociological persuasions
75 have provided a third way to 
the neofunctionalist/ multilevel governance and intergovernmentalist approaches. Institutions are understood as 
rules and shared meanings that enable social interaction. Since the 1990s, a version of the new institutionalism, 
social constructivism or sociological institutionalism, has presented a social scientific alternative for the study of 
European integration. By introducing Anthony Giddens’s social theory into international relations theory and 
European studies,
76 social constructivism opens new paths to scholarly work that emphasize socialization and the 
social construction of reality, following in spirit Berger and Luckmann.
77 In contrast to previous approaches, social 
constructivism underlines the symbolic aspects of European integration, that is, discourses, norms and, more 
generally, the power of words and symbols to construct two distinct political ontologies or legitimate political 
orders relative to Europe: a Europe of nation-states and a Europe of transnational processes.  
  According to some social constructivists,
78 the purpose of their research program is to study relatively 
neglected areas of the integration process, such as polity formation through rules and norms, the transformation of 
identities, the role of ideas, and the uses of language. Social constructivism focus on what practitioners call social 
ontologies, which include such diverse phenomena as intersubjective meanings, cultures of national security, and 
symbolic politics. By emphasizing social interaction, they are able to examine in a new way the structure of the 
international system, and the dialectics between states and the international order. According to some scholars,
79 
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social constructivism is situated between rationalism, represented by such approaches as neorealism and neoliberal 
institutionalism, and reflectivism, which includes postmodernism and poststructuralism.
80  
  Other approaches have supplemented and, to a certain extent, challenged these policy-oriented, high politics 
approaches to European integration.
81 Some of these anthropological and sociological institutional approaches look 
at integration processes from the bottom up, to use Simon Bulmer’s terms, or at the level of everyday political life. 
French political anthropologist Marc Abélès has studied the European Parliament and the European Commission 
from the inside, analyzing the internal dividing lines and tensions of these institutions. By mapping the 
contradictions of transnational political representation, Abélès strives to present European political institutions as 
they reveal themselves to an outside observer.
82 The Member of the European Parliament has to represent both the 
national interests of his/her country and those of the transnational institution s/he serves.
83 The European 
parliamentarian is a new type of politician who can be contrasted with both the traditional nationally-elected 
politician and the international politician appointed to an international organization. In his study on the cabinet of 
the former head of the European Commission Jacques Delors, George Ross scrutinizes the strategies of Delors’s 
cabinet in the Commission, and the numerous practical questions that arise when national politicians and civil 
servants end up serving common, European interests in the European Commission.
84
  While presenting an alternative approach, social constructivism also has its weaknesses. A major one is the 
absence of a theory of agency.
85 As social constructivism concentrates on the agency-structure interaction, giving 
priority to structure, it neglects political action as situated action, that is action in specific institutional settings. 
Another weakness of social constructivism is that, despite its stated aims to study the social fabric of European 
politics, it is only weakly sociological. Its protagonists are eager to examine the discursive processes informing 
European integration, identity, norms of behavior, and so on, leaving largely untouched the key issue of the social 
characteristics of the individuals and groups who, through their activities, construct this symbolic and material 
entity.  
  Compared to other approaches in European integration studies, one of the advantages of structural 
constructivism as a variation of social constructivism
86 is that it does not commit itself to either a state-centric or 
supranational point of view. As the European Union is a changing political reality that unites supranational and 
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national elements a scholar sticking to one or the other approach introduces a significant bias in his/her research,
87 
a bias which prevents him/her from accounting for the ‘nature of the beast’.
88 Structural constructivism as a holistic 
approach requires painting with broad strokes the structural features of the emerging political field in which 
political agents act. In contrast to the traditional nation-state theorized by Bourdieu which forms a unipolar 
political field, the EU should be analyzed as a more or less structured multipolar political field where 
supranational, intergovernmental, national, and regional public, semi-public, and private institutions share power. 
In the following, I will present a preliminary analysis of the European Union using an adapted structural 
constructivist framework. 
  Currently the EU is a multileveled and polycentric emerging political field structured around two poles: EU 
institutions where transnational political resources are concentrated and which provide institutional sites where 
these resources can be acquired, and national decision-making centers. The main structural tension in the EU is 
between these supranational and the national poles, an opposition that takes a multitude of forms, enveloping 
institutional structures, ideas of the political order (confederation or federation), economic policy (regulated 
capitalism or neoliberalism,
89 political careers (European or national)
90, and so on. The process of EU-integration is 
one of transnational political stratification where certain interests have been favored at the expense of others, 
business at the expense of labor, consumers at the expense of citizens, elites at the expense of the people. The 
groups occupying central positions in the “Eurosphere,” as Dusan Sidjanski has called the groups and interests tied 
to European decision-making,
91mostly civil servants, experts, technocrats, and nongovernmental agents. 
  While the dimension supranational-national forms the first dimension of the European political field, political 
legitimacy constitutes its second dimension. Collective European symbolic political resources consist of two 
subtypes that correspond homologically to two types of national political legitimacy, executive and legislative 
legitimacy, or output and input legitimacy.
92 Executive legitimacy is held by agents in institutions such as the 
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European Commission and the Council of Ministers, institutions that partly hold differing conceptions of the EU’s 
future. Legislative legitimacy is located in institutions such as the Council and the European Parliament, or, at the 
national level, in national governments and ministries and legislative bodies such as the lower chambers.
93 The 
dominance of executive legitimacy over legislative legitimacy corresponds to the dominance of institutions such as 
the Council of Ministers, an assembly of Member State executives, the European Commission, a supranational 
bureaucracy, and national governments over elected bodies such as parliaments. The Commission, which can be 
considered the EU’s main executive body,
94 presents itself as the privileged caretaker of the European interest.
95 
Both the Commission and the Council have legislative, executive, and administrative competence. The European 
Parliament is relatively powerless, although lately it has been getting stronger. The main legislative body is still the 
Council. This political authority structure is isomorphic or structurally similar to the political structures of the 
established and homogeneous national political subfields, where the real decision-making centers have for some 
time been outside the direct control of legislative institutions.
96  
  The double political stratification process between supranational/ intergovernmental and national levels on 
the one hand and between executive and legislative legitimacy on the other hand has been legitimized through 
incremental changes and by the myriad of political strategies applied by political agents at all levels of the 
European polity, making symbolic reversal of this European political authority structure very difficult, if not 
impossible. Supranational and executive stratification have developed in close symbiosis, reinforcing one another, 
creating new networks of power, furthering democratic erosion, and becoming more autonomous vis-a-vis national 
and legislative processes. At the same time, European integration is deepening and widening as decision-making 
becomes more communitarian through qualified majority voting and as new policy areas come into the sphere of 
the EU and new countries join the Union. 
  The European Union has taken over some of the functions of the nation-state, but a European civil society 
and an effective European democracy have not yet developed. In its current form, the European Union is 
undemocratic, a polity without a civil society, either dispensing law without legitimacy or providing some amount 
of output legitimacy and little input legitimacy.
97 In fact, it seems a division of political labor has developed in 
which the Commission and the Council provide output legitimacy and the state executives input legitimacy. While 
the EU does not possess the traditional attributes of a state, such as the monopoly of legitimate violence, or of a 
federation, such as a constitution and taxing and spending powers, it is nonetheless both a super-national political 
authority in the narrow sense of the term (the EU as a synonym for Brussels) and a relational power structure (the 
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EU as a multileveled political space) in which certain transnational groups and interests increasingly dominate the 
more established social political units that partly compose it. Nation-states and federal states are embedded in this 
larger political unit, becoming even more disjointed and fragmented as they transfer, willingly and unwillingly, 
some of their traditional privileges to a supranational bureaucracy and the organized interests that have developed 
around it. The EU as a constitutional order rests on a concept of sovereignty divided between European Union 
institutions seeking constitutional legitimacy through the Convention led by Giscard d’Estaing, and the national 
constitutional orders that compose the Union.  
  At the same time, struggles over the definition of Europe and over the value of European political resources 
are taking place. The European field of political stances is organized around the issue of federalism/confederalism. 
At the transnational level the EU bureaucracy, various powerful transnational interest groups (for instance 
industrial groups), and the political representatives of smaller Member States oppose the attempts  by political 
representatives of some of the larger Member States to keep the EU a confederation of nation-states. The European 
Commission increasingly determines the rules of the transnational political game through institutional 
configurations (for instance, by reinforcing its position vis-a-vis the Council), the imposition of new principles of 
social classification (for instance through directives), rulings of the European Court of Justice (70% of new 
legislation is at the European level), initiatives and alliances with public and private actors, and so on. This 
transnational concentration of resources, the networks it creates, and the technocratic decision-making it reinforces 
also transform the political cultures of the national and regional political subfields, as the case of the European 
Parliament demonstrates. For instance in Finland, a member of the EU since 1995, this supranational concentration 
of resources and the EU’s dual authority structure have reinforced the power position of political institutions such 
as the office of the prime minister in the national state machinery. Although dominated in the emerging European 
political field, national and European parliaments and elections still play a significant role in the legitimation of 
political authority and in societal mobilization around common issues. In this light, the EU is a regime of political 
domination in which certain interest groups have succeeded in stacking the cards, regularizing interactions 
favorable to them and delegitimizing others, while maintaining unequal resource distribution. As the EU has 
institutionalized and European governance developed, these groups have become more aware of their common 
interests, and more and more reluctant to change the political order on which their power is based. As long as this 
European ruling class does not have an interest in democratizing the system, it is difficult to see how the system 
could be democratized.      
  Although European Parliament elections have relatively little political significance in the sense that 
government formation does not depend on their results,
98 their effects may lie elsewhere. In Finland, the elections 
to the European Parliament have enabled individuals who wouldn’t normally succeed politically to gain an 
electoral position.
99 At the same time, the last European elections in 1999 were characterized by a total lack of 
interest from top politicians, testifying to a more systematic strategy of delegitimation of European electoral 
legitimacy that was intended to safeguard the interests of a “cartel of elites,” to use Ralf Dahrendorf’s term,
100 and 
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the value of the European executive resources it controlled. For former Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen, what was 
important was what happened at the executive level, and more specifically at the level of the European Council and 
the Council of ministers of the European Union. This indifference toward the European electoral institution 
reinforced the structural marginality of the European Parliament in Finnish politics. However, it also enabled T.V. 
celebrities, former sports stars, and other citizen-electors known to the general public to win seats in the European 
Parliament, and, paradoxically, caused a real public discussion relative to European issues to emerge.  
  In France as in other domestic political subfields, the picture is not totally different, as there also the 
European Parliament is a marginal political institution that functions as a relatively weakly regulated access point 
to national political subfields, attracting a variety of political novices, mavericks, and wannabe politicians. While 
the European Parliament might have become a viable political alternative for some,
101 for the majority of the 
political class and the public it still is a relatively insignificant institution, an unidentified political object. In 
France, women politicians have been successful in these elections, as have regional politicians unknown to the 
national audience. The success of women politicians can be explained by the strategies of politicians like François 
Mitterrand, by the strong presence of women in parties such as the Socialist party, and by politicians’ desire to 
show that France is, like other Central and Northern European countries, a modern democracy where women play a 
significant political role.
102 But many of the women initially elected to the European Parliament, where they could 
be out of the way and do as little damage as possible, eventually found their way to other, more central sectors of 
the French political field, even to become ministers. Likewise, for regional politicians the European Parliament has 
presented an alternative avenue to access top national positions in the Senate and the lower chamber, and to further 
their cause, a Europe of regions.  
  In Finland and France, the effects of European integration are formally or functionally the same. European 
elections provide a certain number of new electoral positions. The national political order has been integrated into a 
larger, transnational space, a space whose hierarchies and power structures politicians reproduce through their 
political strategies and career choices. In this political order, European deputies resemble technocrats more than 
politicians.
103 The denationalizing effect of European integration on political habitus is weak. For Finnish and 
French politicians alike, working in Brussels does not present an alternative to a national political career, and they 
do not all become federalists after having worked in the EU. In this sense, the European Parliament is not an 
identitive institution. For many, a transnational political career becomes an additional alternative to more 
traditional prospects at the national, regional, and local level. Transnational career patterns are thus still dominated 
by domestic structures, testifying to a strong path-dependency.
104 In general the political value of European 
legislative experience is weak, rarely leading to top political positions, whereas European executive experience is 
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relatively prized, as top national civil servants and politicians find posts in European institutions.
105 Politics has 
become increasingly dependent on European decision-making, but its capacity to structure domestic politics has 
not grown.
106  
  While these structural transformations condition career patterns, individuals do shape outcomes. Some, who 
are likely to have had unconventional political careers, invest more than others in the European Parliament, but this 
investment is at the same time an investment at the national, regional and local levels. These do not exclude one 
another, because politicians use their assets to further their careers on all levels, their national careers being 
dependent in some cases on their local mandates. 
 
Conclusions 
   
Like Weber
107 and authors such as Michels
108 and Marx, Bourdieu assimilates political action with the continuous 
struggle for power. In this he follows the Macchiavellian tradition. The task of social science is to unmask and 
demystify the mechanisms of power. Because he sees the mechanisms of domination as universal, Bourdieu does 
not attempt to theorize a specific kind of democratic legitimacy that would take the form of a democratic political 
field based partly on public debate, deliberation, and the public sphere and partly on specific mechanisms of power 
struggle that would contrast with Weber’s vision of charismatic, legal, and traditional rule. Instead, Bourdieu is 
concerned with demystifying the political game, showing how delegation leads to alienation and usurpation, and 
how the dominated reproduce their own domination. Politics as the noble activity of organization and regulation of 
human communities turns into domination. Bourdieu sees politics neither in terms of the institutional construction 
of a public sphere and public instruments that aim at promoting the general interest and preventing the private use 
of physical violence to settle accounts, nor as a process of adjustment to social pressures.
109 In this respect his 
theory of politics is very much tied to France and its political structures. 
  Following Max Weber’s analysis of spheres of life, Bourdieu analyses politics like any other area of social 
activity such as the economy, religion, or education. Bourdieu’s concept of field refers to a relatively autonomous 
sector of activity that could also be called an organizational field
110 or a game.
111 Each field has its specific capital, 
or resources. Concepts that come close are legitimacy, recognition, or status. Political capital as a scarce symbolic 
resource is what agents endowed with varying amounts of power fight for in the political field.  
 
105. For an analysis of some of the effects of integration on the French political field, cf. Kauppi, “European Union 
Institutions and French Political Careers.” 
106. Katz and Wessels (eds), The European Parliament, National Parliaments, and European Integration, 245. 
107. Lassman, Peter. “Politics, Power, and Legitimation.” In The Cambridge Companion to Weber, edited by 
Stephen Turner. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 83-98. 
108. Michels, Political Parties. 
109. Lipset, Seymour M. “Introduction,” 32, in Michels, Political Parties. 
110. Cf. for instance Powell and DiMaggio (eds) The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. 
111. Bailey, F.G. Stratagems and Spoils: A Social Anthropology of Politics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969).  24
                                                          
  Each field has its dominant habitus, a culture or internalized set of principles of action, preference, and 
evaluation that regulates resource accumulation, what is acceptable, and what isn’t. This specific, internalized 
culture or set of “internalized institutions” constrains and empowers individuals, assigning them roles and 
providing guidelines for legitimate behavior. There is no empowerment without constraints. Far from value-free or 
power-neutral, this culture and its institutional supports are constructed in order to protect the value of certain 
resources and to institutionalize their access and usage. The board is tilted in favor of those with the most capital. 
The field is composed of positions that depend on the capital structures of the individuals and/or groups occupying 
these positions. Adapted from structuralist research, homology or structural isomorphism is the tool with which 
Bourdieu and structural constructivists draw qualitative parallels between position and policy stance and between 
different fields. The idea of structural isomorphism, or an interpretation of it, has been successfully applied by 
some organization theorists like Powell and DiMaggio,
112 and sociological institutionalists/social constructivists 
more generally. 
  In the political field, binary logic structures not only political parties and ideologies; it permeates the political 
field as a whole, from political parties and other political organizations between the progressive and conservative 
wings all the way down to the habitus of an individual who might have evolved from a radical youth into a 
conservative party official. Consideration of this structuralist binary logic differentiates the structural constructivist 
theory of politics from most forms of social constructivism, which analyse structures as regularities in social 
interaction, as partially organized along binary lines, or as culture.
113
  But the institutional location of an agent, for instance in the European bureaucracy, is both the result of 
resource accumulation and also a condition for the accumulation of resources. By being appointed to the 
Commission a national civil servant is transformed into a European civil servant, the carrier of collective European 
symbolic capital, which enables him to acquire even more of this type of resource. In a structural constructivist 
framework, similarity in political behavior and cooperation can be attributed to structural location, habitus (for 
instance certain experiences), or a mixture of the two. Indeed, some of the most interesting research questions 
relative to the European Union have to do with identity formation: have the structural transformations of domestic 
political subfields and the processes of homogenization of these subfields led to the construction of a European 
political habitus? What mechanisms regulate the stability of this habitus?  
  Scholars agree that the European Union is a unique political formation, a political field sui generis. However, 
studying the EU,  most commit themselves to outdated theories and concepts. Adapting Bourdieu’s structural 
constructivist political theory to the study of European integration provides scholars with a point of view that 
focuses on power relations in the constitution of a European polity. Who gets what, when, and how? Structural 
constructivism aims at analyzing how individuals and groups institute structured power relations by mobilizing 
resources and regularizing certain types of interactions and values at the expense of others. This approach has 
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several advantages compared to social constructivism and more traditional approaches such as neofunctionalism 
and intergovernmentalism.  
  First, it presents a holistic approach to political processes that binds together behavior into a unified 
framework, emphasizing cultural and organizational aspects of politics
114 without committing itself to either a 
state- or Commission-centric point of view.  In contrast to most variations of social constructivism, it offers a 
formal framework for the study of political behavior. Individuals and groups act in a structured environment in a 
goal-oriented manner to acquire political resources. The nation-state is not an unitary agent,
115 as even some social 
constructivists assume, but a structured political space where different interests fight over the right to speak in the 
name of the state at the transnational level. In the case of the EU, the European Commission and the Council of 
Ministers are not unitary political agents. Some representatives of national governments might share with some 
representatives of the Commission a federalist conception of the EU’s future, while others might disagree and 
promote a more intergovernmentalist vision. Partly, this division is tied to the resources available to these agents, 
resources based on nationality (large versus small nation-states), on political ideology (left-right), on careers (pro-
European politicians might envision European careers for themselves), and so on. The structural constructivist 
framework enables an analysis of the structuration of a European political order, composed of both a 
transnational/intergovernmental level
116 and more established national constitutional orders and regional units, 
public and private actors, forming a single structure that constrains and enables political action.
117 However, 
nation-states are not Weberian states. Rather, they are fragmented, disjointed, connected to the European level 
through various networks and unofficial authority structures, such as that provided by ENA alumni in the French 
case.
118 National political fields have exploded simultaneously with transnational political stratification. As 
European integration has advanced, especially through the introduction of the euro, the significance of this 
European symbolic and social space as the structured context of European political action has increased. National 
transformations are structurally linked to this supranational space and the system dynamic it provides. As political 
value is always context-bound, transformations at national level - such as the constitutional reforms in Finland and 
France in 2000 - have to be examined as elements of a broader transnational political field that is becoming more 
structured. Guided in their actions more by policy than by loss of national sovereignty, national politicians might 
have political reasons for not disclosing the full effect of the EU on their own political actions. 
  Second, like social constructivism, structural constructivism does not consider culture, norms, or institutions 
to be power neutral.
119 However, in contrast to social constructivism’s ideational conception of culture, structural 
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constructivists analyze culture “materially” in terms of power resources which are linked to variables such as 
political experience, class, education, gender, nationality, and so on.
120 Analysis is not restricted to class, as is often 
the case in Bourdieu’s framework, as national origin for instance is a key factor when evaluating a political agent’s 
weight on specific issues. There is no European social field behind or as the basis of the European political field as 
in Bourdieu’s interpretation of the political field. Nor is analysis limited to a national context such as the French 
one, as was the case in Bourdieu’s own empirical studies, or to general mechanisms of political representation. 
Individuals and groups use these resources in their political struggles to acquire status and recognition. Following 
elitist political theorists like Michels, Mosca, and Pareto, structural constructivist scholars’ critical approach is 
sensitive to the power struggles that attempt to define the common good and the structural biases that favor some at 
the expense of others. The EU as a political system that is not limited to the supranational or transnational level
121 
but that includes four levels of political activity, transforms some particular interests into European interests and 
stigmatizes others as “narrow-minded” and un-European. 
  Third, a developed structural constructivist framework that is more Weberian than Saussurean enables a 
refined analysis of political action. As the EU is an emerging political field, the properties of agents are, in certain 
cases, as important  in explaining political strategies as are changing rules and institutional arrangements. The 
specificity of political resources as a type of symbolic capital can be examined only through analysis of situated 
action. As political capital is, to a certain extent, valuable only if used and is acquired only through political action 
its analysis has to concentrate on political encounters and political action as reproduction/ transformation of the 
structures of the political field. Generally, in structured encounters certain resources are bracketed, while emergent 
properties provide some agents with additional resources. 
  In order to account for political action, a developed structural constructivist approach to European regional 
integration has to address the temporal, polycentric and multileveled character of the EU. History is present when 
political agents adapt to the sometimes rapidly changing EU-field. Following their internalized political habitus, 
they legitimize their actions by referring to cultural models based on national traditions, for instance. Temporality 
takes also other forms. Various temporalities - such as fifteen national election cycles - create a complex internal 
dynamic. Fragmentation is not only temporal but also spatial. The EU’s multilevel character requires that the 
multipositionality of agents be taken into account. In contrast to Bourdieu’s interpretation of structural positions, 
where individuals occupy one position at the time, in a context like the European political field positions are 
always overdetermined as the individuals occupying them also belong to several other relational entities. This 
multipositionality provides agents with valuable resources. For instance, national ministers, as representatives not 
only of their Member States in Brussels but also of the EU in their domestic arenas, can use the information they 
have to further policies at lower levels. Multileveled political games are more complicated than the two-leveled 
games scholars such as Schneider and Cederman have studied.
122 The power of institutions to constitute 
preferences and agents depends on the structuration level of the area under scrutiny. Behavioral uncertainty can be 
linked to weak structuration, as in the case of the European Parliament. In this case, choice is not necessarily 
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institutionally set, which prevents an organizational analysis of choice.
123 Institutional structures constrain and 
empower to varying degrees. 
  The challenge facing scholars working in the same theoretical vain as Bourdieu is how to adapt and develop 
some of Bourdieu’s intellectual tools to the transnational political context of the European Union. The European 
political field comprises both a transnational/intergovernmental level and national constitutional orders and 
regional units as well as public and private actors. Structural constructivism provides a framework for analysing 
this political field as a single structure that constrains and enables political action. By linking political strategies to 
broader structural transformations in the European political field, structural constructivists can enlighten processes 
such as the restructuration of national political fields. 
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